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ARTICLE
FRICTION IN RECONCILING CRIMINAL
FORFEITURE AND BANKRUPTCY: THE
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE PART*
SARAH N. WELLING** & JANE LYLE HORD***

INTRODUCTION
The federal government uses two general types of asset forfeiture,
criminal and civil. This Article addresses criminal forfeiture, which
allows the government to take property from defendants when they are
convicted of crimes. It is “an aspect of punishment imposed following
conviction of a substantive criminal offense.”1
Criminal forfeiture is a sanction that can be imposed on defendants
only after they are convicted of an authorizing substantive crime. Thus,
criminal forfeiture is basically another part of the sentence rather than a
separate charge in itself.2 And forfeiture is a jury decision: if the
defendant is convicted on the underlying crime or crimes, the forfeiture
count is then submitted to the jury.3 The jury must make predicate
factual findings in order to impose forfeiture. If the jury decides to
impose forfeiture, the judge has no discretion to overrule the jury.

*
Presented by Sarah N. Welling at: A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue: White Collar Crime,
Asset Forfeiture and Business Bankruptcy (Conference at the Golden Gate University School of
Law, San Francisco, November 4-5, 2011).
**
Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor, College of Law, University of
Kentucky.
***
J.D. Candidate, May 2012, College of Law, University of Kentucky; KENTUCKY LAW
JOURNAL, Volume 100, Special Features Editor.
1
Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 356, 363 (1995).
2
See id. at 364.
3
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(5)(B).
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Criminal forfeiture has a short history. Between 1790 and 1970 it
was authorized by Congress only once.4 In 1970, Congress revived
criminal forfeiture for convictions of the most serious drug crime, the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE), and under the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).5 In 1984, forfeiture
was expanded to apply to all drug felonies,6 and in 1986, Congress
enacted a third criminal forfeiture statute that applied to money
laundering crimes.7 Over the years, Congress has amended the money
laundering forfeiture statute to include so many other crimes that it is
now more accurately characterized as a general criminal forfeiture
statute.
Thus, the law of criminal forfeiture is established by three main
statutes:8 the drug forfeiture statute,9 the RICO forfeiture statute,10 and
the general criminal forfeiture statute.11 These three forfeiture statutes
are very similar. The drug forfeiture statute and the RICO forfeiture
statute were adopted together in 1970 and are identical in many ways.
Accordingly, courts often find authority under one persuasive for the
other.12 The general criminal forfeiture statute, enacted later, adopts by

4

United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 1988) (between 1790 and 1970,
criminal forfeiture was authorized only once to recover life estates of Confederate soldiers).
5
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (Westlaw 2012); see also 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-64 (Westlaw 2012).
6
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (Westlaw 2012).
7
18 U.S.C.A. § 982 (Westlaw 2012).
8
Other criminal forfeiture statutes exist, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2253 (Westlaw 2012) (criminal
forfeiture authorized for crimes of sexual exploitation and other abuse of children involving visual
depictions under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2252A, 2260 (Westlaw 2012)) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1467
(Westlaw 2012) (criminal forfeiture authorized for violations of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1460 et seq.
(Westlaw 2012) (involving obscene materials)).
9
21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (Westlaw 2012); see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 970 (Westlaw 2012).
10
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (Westlaw 2012). RICO does not authorize civil forfeiture, so any
RICO forfeiture is necessarily criminal.
11
18 U.S.C.A. § 982 (Westlaw 2012).
12
See, e.g., United States v. White, 116 F.3d 948, 950 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that drug and
RICO forfeiture statutes should be interpreted “in pari passu”); United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d
1027, 1042 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2468 (1997) (showing by way of legislative
history that Congress intended the statutory definitions of proceeds to be interpreted the same under
the money laundering and drug and RICO forfeiture statutes); United States v. Shifflett, Nos. 935693, 93-5721, 93-5742, 93-5787, 94-1417, 94-5069, 94-5287, 1995 WL 125506, at *3 (4th Cir.
Mar. 23, 1995) (stating that legislative history shows Congress intended RICO and drug forfeiture
statutes to be relevant to each other); United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 362 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994)
(referring to cases and legislative history discussing RICO and drug forfeiture statutes
interchangeably); United States v. Libretti, 38 F.3d 523, 528 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994), aff’d sub nom.
Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995) (noting that cases construing the RICO forfeiture
statute may be used in applying the drug forfeiture statute due to the similarity of the statutory
language); United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1349 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989) (same).
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reference most of the drug forfeiture statute.13 These three statutes are
discussed together below.
Up until the year 2000 or so, the government used criminal
forfeiture less frequently than civil forfeiture because civil forfeiture was
easier for the government. In civil forfeiture actions, among other
advantages, the government’s burden of proof was lower, the burden
shifted off the government to claimants, and claimants had no privilege
against self-incrimination or right to counsel. As discussed further
below, in 2000, and again in 2006, criminal forfeiture was expanded
dramatically, such that the government now uses criminal forfeiture more
frequently.
For the government to take property by criminal forfeiture, the
defendant must be convicted of an authorizing substantive crime, and the
property the government is seeking must fall within the definition of
property subject to forfeiture. These two requirements are discussed in
Parts I and II below. Section III then discusses how third-party claimants
are treated in criminal forfeiture.
The recent prevalence of large scale white collar crime has created
tension between forfeiture and bankruptcy law. Multi-million or
sometimes billion dollar Ponzi schemes have made names such as
Madoff and Dreier infamous for the sheer number of victims they
deceived and the amount of money stolen. Judge Jed Rakoff best
described the issue this way:
An under-appreciated evil of substantial frauds like those of Marc
Dreier is how they pit their victims against one another. Where, as
here, the funds remaining after the fraud is uncovered are insufficient
to make whole Dreier’s numerous victims and creditors, these
unfortunates are left to squabble over who should get what. In this
case, moreover, resolution of these competing claims involves
consideration of three bodies of law–criminal law, securities law, and
bankruptcy law–that cannot always be reconciled without some
14
friction.

Cases such as Dreier cause a collision between the government’s right to
forfeitable property with the claims of innocent victims and creditors
13

18 U.S.C.A. § 982(b)(1) (Westlaw 2012) provides:

The forfeiture of property under this section, including any seizure and disposition of the
property and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, shall be governed by the
provisions of section 413 (other than subsection (d) of that section) of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853).
14

United States v. Dreier, 682 F. Supp. 2d 417, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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when a defendant, and in some cases his or her business, files for
bankruptcy. Without some agreement and compromise with the
government,15 all the forfeitable property of the defendant may be
removed from the bankruptcy estate.16 This property is only available to
creditors and victims through asserting a defense available to third
parties in contesting criminal forfeiture.17 Any attempt by the court to
intervene in the basic forfeiture process in favor of victims beyond what
is either provided by the statute or agreed to by the government would be
considered an abuse of discretion.18 Accordingly, if a third party does not
have a viable defense to forfeiture, the victim is left at the mercy of the
Department of Justice with a petition for remission or mitigation, for
which the Attorney General has sole and unreviewable discretion to grant
or deny a request.19 The goal of this Article is to give an overview of the
forfeiture process, specifically in relation to claims victims and creditors
might assert as third-party claimants.
I.

DEFENDANT IS CONVICTED OF A CRIME AUTHORIZING THE
FORFEITURE SANCTION

The substantive crimes that authorize criminal forfeiture are set out
in the three main forfeiture statutes20 and numerous specific provisions.21
In addition, in year 2000, Congress adopted a provision that drastically
increased the number of crimes that authorized criminal forfeiture.22 As
part of the second major revision of the forfeiture laws in 2006, the
15

See, e.g., id. at 418 (describing the “Coordination Agreement” between the government
and the chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee for Dreier LLP).
16
Gowan v. The Patriot Grp. (In re Dreier LLP), 452 B.R. 391, 411-12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2011).
17
See United States v. Frykholm, 362 F.3d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 2004).
18
Compare United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1305-11 (11th Cir. 2011) (district court
appointed receiver to marshal defendants’ assets for fines, forfeiture and restitution; court of appeals
holds this is abuse of discretion because appointment of receiver is extraordinary equitable remedy,
and federal and state law provide federal government with adequate remedies based on FDCPA, 28
U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq., and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 66 and 69, which are far more
efficient), with United States v. King, No. 3:06-cr-212-J-33MCR, 2009 WL 4628224, at *1-2 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 2, 2009) (recognizing that the government may agree to forgo forfeiture for legitimate
reasons, such as allowing victims to collect restitution, and approving of such an agreement).
19
Regulations Governing the Remission or Mitigation of Civil and Criminal Forfeitures, 28
C.F.R. § 9.1 (Westlaw 2012).
20
The statutes cover all drug felonies, 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (Westlaw 2012); RICO interests,
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (Westlaw 2012); and general crimes, 18 U.S.C.A. § 982 (Westlaw 2012).
21
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 (Westlaw 2012) (gambling business); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252
(Westlaw 2012) (child pornography and exploitation).
22
NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 1047-48
(West Publ’g, 5th ed. 2010); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2461 (Westlaw 2012).
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statute was amended to include a provision that the courts have
interpreted to expand the crimes authorizing criminal forfeiture to
include all the crimes that authorize civil forfeiture.23 It now appears that
the challenge is to identify a crime that does not authorize the sanction of
criminal forfeiture.24 Following that revision, and its attendant increase
in forfeiture filings, criminal forfeiture actions outnumbered civil actions
for the first time.25
II.

DEFINE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE

After the defendant is convicted of an authorizing crime, the next
step is to identify the property subject to forfeiture.
A.

TWO BASIC CATEGORIES OF FORFEITABLE PROPERTY

The property subject to forfeiture can be put into two general
categories. The first is proceeds of the crime. The concept of proceeds
is relatively new to criminal law. It first appeared in criminal forfeiture
statutes only in 1970, so it has no common law history. The statutory
language defining proceeds varies among the statutes.26 In general,
23

See generally United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189,199-201 (3d Cir. 2006). The
statute adopted in 2000 is 28 U.S.C. § 2461. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-185, 114 Stat. 202. It was amended in 2006. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). The result is that every crime that
authorizes civil forfeiture also authorizes criminal forfeiture, and the crimes that authorize civil
forfeiture are many. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 981 (Westlaw 2012), which adopts the list of crimes in 18
U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(7) (Westlaw 2012), which in turn adopts the list of crimes in 18 U.S.C.A. §
1961(1) (Westlaw 2012).
24
One crime that does not authorize forfeiture is 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (Westlaw 2012) (false
statements), which is included under 18 U.S.C.A. § 982 (Westlaw 2012) only for statements
“involving the sale of assets acquired or held by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation” or “any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
statements, pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(3)-(4) (Westlaw 2012).
25
ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT at 1048 n.21. Nevertheless,
civil forfeiture is still used by the government in many situations because the government must only
prove the defendant’s guilt of a predicate crime by a preponderance of the evidence. See United
States v. Liquidators of Eur. Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011). Therefore, if
the government does not have enough evidence to hold the defendant criminally liable for the crime,
it can still seek civil forfeiture and secure a judgment against any forfeitable property. Id.
26
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (“. . . any property constituting, or derived
from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation”); 18
U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (“any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds the
person obtained directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982 (a)(3)(F),
(a)(5)(E) (Westlaw 2012) (“. . . any property, real or personal, which represents or is traceable to the
gross receipts obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation”); 18 U.S.C.A. §
982(a)(6)(A)(ii) (Westlaw 2012) (“any property real or personal . . . that constitutes, or is derived
from or is traceable to the proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from the commission of the
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however, courts have concluded that proceeds include the gross receipts
rather than net profits,27 and in 2009, Congress adopted this definition in
the context of the money laundering crime.28 Additionally, if there are
multiple defendants, they are held jointly and severally liable for all
foreseeable proceeds that result from their crime(s).29
The second general category of property that the government may
forfeit is property used or involved in the crime. Again, the statutory
language varies.30 Based on the historical development of criminal
forfeiture, in the context of drug crimes, this property is sometimes
referred to as “facilitating property.”31 Facilitating property has a
legitimate genesis unconnected to the underlying criminal activity, i.e., it
was not generated by crime and is not the proceeds of the crime. But
when defendants use their clean/untainted property in committing a
crime, it becomes forfeitable under this second category. So, for
example, a defendant who legitimately owns an office building and runs
an investment company from the building but turns the company into a
Ponzi scheme may forfeit the building as property that facilitated the
crime.
B.

MONEY JUDGMENTS

In addition to forfeiting property that is proceeds of the crime and
property that facilitated the crime, the government has recently had
success in the courts when seeking monetary forfeiture judgments in lieu
of particular pieces of property.32 These money judgments are not
mentioned in the forfeiture statutes explicitly but are authorized

offense of which the person is convicted”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(8)(B) (Westlaw 2012)
(“constituting, derived from, or traceable to the gross proceeds that the defendant obtained directly
or indirectly as a result of the offense”).
27
See United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1042 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom.
McHan v. United States, 520 U.S. 1281 (1997).
28
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(9) (Westlaw 2012).
29
See, e.g., United States v. Van Nguyen, 602 F.3d 886, 904 (8th Cir. 2010).
30
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (“any of the [defendant’s] property used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such
violation”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (“. . . any property, real or personal, involved
in such offense”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II) (Westlaw 2012) (“any property real or
personal . . . that is used to facilitate, or is intended to be used to facilitate, the commission of the
offense”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(8)(A) (Westlaw 2012) (“used or intended to be used to commit, to
facilitate, or to promote the commission of such offense”).
31
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (“[A]ny of the [defendant’s] property used,
or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such
violation”) (emphasis added).
32
See United States v. Olguin, 643 F.3d 384, 395-98 (5th Cir. 2011).
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implicitly by the government’s power to seize substitute property. This
power is described in more detail below. The theory is that the
government may seek money judgments because the government has the
power to seize substitute property when the specific forfeitable property
is unavailable for one reason or another, and money is just another form
of property.
C.

DEFENDANT HAS AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY

In order to forfeit any property, the government must prove that the
defendant had an interest in that property. The reason is that criminal
forfeiture is considered an in personam action against the defendant, over
whom the government has jurisdiction because it has seized him.33 The
government therefore has power over all the property the defendant has
an interest in. If the defendant has no interest in the property, the
government has no jurisdiction over the property.
This theoretical foundation of criminal forfeiture can be contrasted
with civil forfeiture actions. Civil forfeiture actions are in rem actions
against the property itself.34 These cases have names like United States
v. $6,976,934.65, Plus Interest Deposited into Royal Bank of Scotland
International, Account No. 2029-56141070, Held in the Name of
Soulbury Ltd., and Property Traceable Thereto.35 In these actions, the
government is bringing a civil action against the property directly,
seeking to adjudicate all persons’ rights in the property, and the
government’s jurisdiction is based on its seizure of the property. In
criminal forfeiture, in contrast, the extent of the defendant’s interest in
the property, if contested, is adjudicated at the stage called an ancillary

33

See United States v. Liquidators of Eur. Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir.

2011).
34

Id.
United States v. Soulberry Limited, 554 F.3d 123 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also United States
v. Approximately $1.67 Million (US) in Cash, Stock, and Other Valuable Assets Held by or at: 1)
Total Aviation Ltd., Account No. 7092686, Located at Barclays Bank PLC, Grand Cayman, Cayman
Islands, British West Indies; 2) Deacon Barclays De Zoete Wedd Limited, Account No. 13603A-2
aka Barclays Private Bank & Trust CM1633, Located at Barclays Private Bank & Trust (Cayman)
Limited, Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, British West Indies; 3) Total Financial Consultants Ltd.,
Account Reference 310205-633500, Located at the Barclays Private Bank & Trust (Cayman)
Limited, Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, British West Indies; 4) Cashiers Check 11405244-152 in
the Amount of $85,000 (US), Drawn at the Royal Bank of Canada, Georgetown, Grand Cayman,
Cayman Islands, British West Indies, on or about March 20, 1995; and 5) Cashiers Check 11405244141 in the Amount of $21,250 (US) Drawn at the Royal Bank of Canada, Georgetown, Grand
Cayman, Cayman Islands, British West Indies, on or about March 17, 1995, 513 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.
2008).
35
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proceeding,36 which is held after the defendant is convicted and
sentenced.
D.

A “NEXUS” EXISTS BETWEEN THE CRIME AND THE PROPERTY

In order for property to be deemed subject to forfeiture, there must
be what the courts call a “nexus” between the property and the crime.37
This nexus requirement was developed by the courts based on the
conclusion that it is implicit in the statutory language. Generally, this
requirement is only significant when property is forfeited under the
theory that it facilitated the crime. In contrast, if the property is forfeited
under the theory that it is proceeds, inevitably a nexus exists: the
property was by definition generated by the crime. Furthermore, if the
government is seeking a money judgment, the theory is that this is
substitute property, and no nexus between substitute property and the
crime need be established. So, if the government is seeking forfeiture on
the basis that property facilitated a crime, the courts require that a nexus,
or substantial connection, exist between the crime and the property.38
E.

TITLE TO THE PROPERTY AND THE “RELATION BACK” DOCTRINE

The forfeiture statutes all provide that “[a]ll right, title, and interest
in [forfeitable] property . . . vests in the United States upon the
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture . . . .”39 This legal fiction,
called the “relation back” doctrine, means that the title to forfeitable
property vests in the federal government at the time the crime is
committed or at the time the property is used to facilitate the crime.
Because title vests in the government at the time of the crime, anything
that is done to the property after that by the defendant or a third party
does not change its character—it is still the government’s property.
The effect of the relation back provision varies depending on which
theory of forfeiture the government uses. For proceeds, the relation back
doctrine means that proceeds were never the property of the criminal
defendant, because at their creation, i.e., when the defendant generated
them through the crime, title vested in the government. The defendant

36

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(c); see also WRIGHT & WELLING, 3 FED. PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 573 (4th ed.).
37
See, e.g., United States v. Hull, 606 F.3d 524, 527-29 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Van
Nguyen, 602 F.3d 886, 903 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the defendant’s home had a sufficient nexus
to support forfeiture but his BMW did not).
38
United States v. Hull, 606 F.3d 524, 527-29 (8th Cir. 2010).
39
21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (Westlaw 2012).
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never has any claim of title. For property that facilitated the crime, on
the other hand, relation back means that title shifts from the defendant to
the government. Facilitating property legitimately belonged to the
defendant up until the time of the crime, and the relation back doctrine
legally shifts the title from the defendant to the government when the
property is used in the crime.
F.

GOVERNMENT POWER TO SEIZE SUBSTITUTE PROPERTY

The government is authorized to seize substitute property if the
exact property subject to forfeiture is unavailable due to actions by the
defendant. The statutes provide:
(1) [I]f any [forfeitable] property . . . as a result of any act or omission
of the defendant—
(A) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(B) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
party;
(C) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(D) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(E) has been commingled with other property which cannot be
divided without difficulty
....
the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the
40
defendant . . . .

Congress’s rationale for giving the government this power to seize
substitute property is to ensure that defendants cannot evade the
forfeiture. Seizure of substitute assets is meant to deprive the defendant
of all forfeitable assets or the value thereof.
The substitute property power is the justification for the allowance
of monetary judgments.41 By allowing monetary judgments, the courts
intend to effectuate the broad remedial purpose of the forfeiture acts42
and “ensur[e] that all eligible criminal defendants receive the mandatory
forfeiture sanction Congress intended and disgorge their ill-gotten gains,

40

21 U.S.C.A. § 853(p) (Westlaw 2012).
See United States v. Olguin, 643 F.3d 384, 395-98 (5th Cir. 2011) (including a list of other
cases approving of monetary judgments).
42
Id. at 397.
41
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even those already spent.”43 With this purpose in mind, all circuits to
which the issue of monetary judgments has been presented have
approved of their imposition.44
The government’s power to seize substitute property is only
relevant to conflicts between the government and defendant, because the
doctrine does not authorize the government to forfeit substitute property
held by third parties. The provision allowing seizure of substitute
property applies only to the defendant’s property.45 The government can
take specific transferred assets out of the hands of a third party, but if
that party has since, for example, sold the asset and it is untraceable, the
government cannot seize substitute property under the forfeiture laws.
Rather, it must resort to state common law actions of conversion and
detinue to recover the money.46
Unless the third party can establish either of the two statutory
defenses available to third parties (noted below),47 because substitute
property cannot be seized from third parties,48 the court must determine
exactly how much of the truly forfeitable property is left in the third
parties’ hands. If the forfeitable property is money that has been
commingled with other funds, and there has been an outflow of funds
from the commingled account, the court must determine if the outflow
came from the clean funds or the forfeitable money.49 Even if there is
not enough truly forfeitable money left to satisfy the forfeiture judgment,
the government cannot seize substitute assets from third parties under the
forfeiture laws to satisfy the judgment.50
III. FOLD IN THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANTS
The legal fiction created by the relation back doctrine, i.e., that title
to forfeitable property vests in the government at the moment it becomes
forfeitable, creates real problems for third parties. As the defendant no
43

United States v. Casey, 444 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006).
See Olguin, 643 F.3d at 397.
45
United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d 660, 668 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 788 (1997).
46
See id. (describing how attorneys for a large scale drug dealer took drug proceeds as fees
and the government pursued the law firm when it was unable to obtain a sufficient return from the
convicted defendants; by the time the government tried to obtain a forfeiture order against the firm,
it had allegedly already spent the money out of its general fund, and the government could only
pursue the firm through state common law tort actions).
47
See infra Part III, which details third-party claims.
48
Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d at 668.
49
United States v. Saccoccia, 354 F.3d 9, 13-14 n.49 (1st Cir. 2003).
50
See, e.g., id.; Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d at 668.
44
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longer has good title to any forfeitable property, subsequent transfers to
third parties do not change its character from that of the government’s
property.
The forfeiture statutes specify the interaction between the relation
back doctrine and the rights of third parties. Specifically, the statute
provides:
Third party transfers. All right, title, and interest in [forfeitable]
property . . . vests in the United States upon the commission of the
[crime]. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a
person other than the defendant . . . shall be . . . forfeited to the United
States, unless the transferee establishes [one of the two defenses
discussed below.]51

Thus, the government can take forfeitable property out of the hands of
third parties.52 Combined with the relation back doctrine, this means that
the defendant cannot hide property from the government by giving it or
selling it to others. The statute grants third parties two defenses.53
At this point, the issue can be articulated in terms familiar to both
criminal law and bankruptcy as follows: If title to forfeitable property is
vested in the government such that the defendant does not have good title
to the property, can the defendant transfer good title to third parties, or
are the defendant’s transfers to third parties void or voidable by the
government?54
A.

TWO STATUTORY “DEFENSES” FOR THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANTS

Section 853(n) provides third-party claimants with two possible
defenses.55 The first, the “superior interest defense,” provides that a
third-party claimant may defeat the government’s effort to forfeit the
property if the third party

51

21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (Westlaw 2012).
Id. (“Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the
defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered
forfeited to the United States . . . .”).
53
21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n) (Westlaw 2012).
54
An analogy familiar to commercial transaction attorneys lies under section 2-403 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which permits certain good faith purchasers to obtain good title from a
transferor who held voidable title, but not from a transferor who held no title (e.g., a thief). U.C.C. §
2-403 (Westlaw 2012).
55
See United States v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 330 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that
although there is an “innocent owner” defense to civil forfeiture, this defense is not allowed when
criminal forfeiture is sought); United States v. Soreide, 461 F.3d 1351, 1354 (11th Cir. 2006).
52
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has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such right, title,
or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part
because the right, title, or interest was vested in the [third party] rather
than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the
defendant at the time of the [crime] . . . .56

This defense is actually a question of timing: the third-party claimant has
a legal interest in the property, and that interest renders the forfeiture
invalid because the interest was either (1) vested in the third-party
claimant rather than the defendant at the time of the crime, or (2)
superior to the defendant’s interest at the time of the crime. In plainer
English, this means that, at the time of the crime, when defendant’s
interest shifted to the government, the third party also had an interest in
the property, and the third party’s interest did not shift to the government
as the defendant’s interest did.
The second defense for third parties is called the “bona fide
purchaser defense.” Here, the statute provides that a third-party claimant
can protect his or her property from forfeiture by the government if he or
she is “a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the
property and was at the time of purchase reasonabl[y] without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture . . . .”57 This defense
has two elements. First, for a conduct element, the third party must be a
purchaser for value. Second, for a mens rea element, the third-party
claimant must be, at time of purchase, “reasonabl[y] without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.”58
B.

TWO DEFENSES APPLIED TO THE TWO CATEGORIES OF
FORFEITABLE PROPERTY

The two third-party defenses work differently when applied to the
two general categories of forfeitable property. For the superior interest
defense, if the government is forfeiting the property based on the theory
that it was clean property but was used to facilitate the crime, the third
party will be claiming that, at the time defendant used the property in
committing a crime, the third party had an interest in it that was vested or
superior to the defendant’s interest. This comes up frequently in the
cases. An example is where a defendant husband is convicted of a drug

56

21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n)(6)(A) (Westlaw 2012).
21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n)(6)(B) (Westlaw 2012).
58
Id.
57
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crime involving his jointly owned house. In such a circumstance, the cotenant / wife’s half interest is not forfeited.
On the other hand, when the superior interest defense is applied to
property being forfeited on the theory that it is proceeds of the crime,
there is some confusion. By definition, proceeds do not exist until they
are generated by the defendant committing a crime. Under the relation
back doctrine, title to the proceeds vests in the government at the time of
the crime. In theory then, the defendant never has any title to the
proceeds; title is in the government from birth of the proceeds. Thus, the
answer to whether the third-party claimant’s title is superior to the
defendant’s at the time of the crime would seem to be yes, since the
defendant has no interest in the proceeds, but whether the third party’s
interest is superior to that of the government is a question not clearly
addressed by most courts. The courts that have addressed the issue have
held either that a third party cannot acquire a superior interest, or that any
interest acquired is not superior to that of the government.59 This
treatment by the courts logically follows from the nature of the superior
interest defense as a question of timing. Nevertheless, the confusion in
this area is merited because rare situations where this logic does not work
may arise.60
Now consider the second third-party defense, the bona fide
purchaser defense, when applied to the different types of forfeitable
property. The elements of the defense (purchase for value and mens rea)
are the same for both proceeds and facilitating property. Nevertheless,
because proceeds are normally in the form of currency, whereas
facilitating property is usually some form of personal property,61 the
structure of the transactions will be different. As a result, the nature of
the elements a third-party claimant must establish will take on a different

59

United States v. Martinez, 228 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hooper, 229
F.3d 818, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Kennedy, 201 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2000).
60
For example, if a husband and wife own a house as co-tenants and a third party has a lien
on the house, if the husband sells the lien-holder drugs in exchange for a reduction of the principal of
the value of the lien, the equity in the house gained by the couple from this transaction would be
proceeds. In this situation, the equity created by the crime would be subject to forfeiture at the time
it was generated, but the wife would still have a superior interest in the house itself that would not be
subject to forfeiture. The question would then be what relation the wife’s title in the house would
have to the government’s title in the forfeitable portion of the couple’s equity in the house.
61
While this is not always the case, because the property is used to commit the crime or
involved in some way, most of the time it is some form of non-monetary real or personal property,
such as a car used to traffic drugs, a computer used to download child pornography, etc. Proceeds,
on the other hand, are the gross receipts of the crime, which is most likely in monetary form, not real
or personal property.
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tone depending on whether the forfeitable property is proceeds or used or
involved property.
Facilitating property can, by its very nature, lead to a reasonable
suspicion that it is subject to forfeiture. While this may not be true of a
house or computer, some property by its mere possession or condition
should raise some apprehension on the part of a third-party buyer. For
example, a car that has hidden compartments would lead a reasonable
person to believe that it was used to hide and transport something illegal.
Additionally, the defendant is likely to be the seller in the transaction.
Unless the third-party claimant is an institution with a lien against the
property or a pawn shop, the defendant will usually be engaging in a
transaction with an individual in a non-traditional commercial context.
Therefore, the third-party claimant will likely have more personal
interaction with the defendant than in other arm’s length commercial
transactions and can analyze the circumstances of the one-on-one
transaction more carefully. This allows a court to more easily infer that
the claimant had reasonable cause to believe that the property involved
was forfeitable. Also, as the defendant will tend to be the seller, the
substance of the transaction may be questionable. A defendant looking
to get rid of the property linked to the crime may sell the property for a
price well under its obvious value. This would call into question the
value given by the third party and, if clearly inadequate consideration,
the transaction may not be considered a bona fide purchase by the
court.62
With regard to proceeds, the defendant is more likely to be a buyer
in a traditional commercial setting. The structure of the transaction and
position of the parties makes it less likely that a third party will be
imputed with reasonable cause to believe that the money involved in the
transaction would be subject to forfeiture. Unless the third-party
claimant has some personal relationship with the defendant that would
give the claimant reason to believe that the defendant was involved in
some illegal activity, it is more likely that the claimant can establish the
requisite mens rea. Nevertheless, it is possible that a court would
consider some red-flag events in a transaction enough to impute
reasonable cause to believe to a third-party claimant in an arm’s length
transaction. For example, a large purchase, such as an expensive car or

62

Again, Uniform Commercial Code section 2-403(2) provides an analogy, under which
greater protections are accorded to buyers who purchase from merchants in the business of selling
goods of the kind, provided that the sale was “in the ordinary course of business.” U.C.C. § 2403(2) (Westlaw 2012).
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house, fully paid for in cash could raise a red flag.63 Additionally,
because the defendant is more prone to be the buyer in the transaction,
the issue of adequate consideration is not likely to be an issue, meaning
that the court will tend not to question the transaction’s substance.
CONCLUSION: WHO GETS WHAT IN CRIMINAL FORFEITURE, AND THE
CONFLICT WITH BANKRUPTCY LAW
The law regarding forfeiture in relation to third-party claimants
varies depending on the type of property the government is seeking.
When the government forfeits proceeds, third-party claimants have good
title against the government if they establish the two elements of the
bona fide purchaser defense: they gave value and reasonably lacked
cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture. When the
government forfeits property based on a theory that it facilitated the
crime, third-party claimants have good title against the government if (1)
they establish the two elements of the bona fide purchaser defense, or (2)
they can show that their interest in the property was superior to the
defendant’s interest at the time the property was used in committing a
crime.
Unlike bankruptcy law, with extensive procedures and statutes
covering how much and in what order claimants collect,64 the criminal
law on sorting out the property interests among third-party claimants has
received little attention. Although it is clear that the government’s claim
of forfeiture takes priority over those of victims and creditors when no
defense to forfeiture is available,65 the extent to which the government
can compromise claims and the courts’ ability to pressure the
government to come to an agreement with the other claiming parties has
not been addressed. There is also a lack of guidance when there are
multiple third-party claimants with interests in the same property. Most
forfeiture cases focus on the government’s interest in relation to the
defendant in the guilt and forfeiture phases of the proceedings. Although
there has been an increase in court opinions deriving from ancillary
proceedings between the government and third parties, the interaction
between the multiple bodies of law that can be at play has caused
63

Cf. United States v. Corchado-Peralta, 318 F.3d 255, 258-60 (1st Cir. 2003) (discussing, in
the context of money laundering, circumstances that could raise suspicion that the transaction was
designed to conceal the proceeds of criminal activity).
64
See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-11 (Westlaw 2012) (statutes governing the relationship of claims
and creditors with the bankruptcy estate); 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 726, 943, 1129, 1225, 1325 (Westlaw
2012) (establishing basic distribution schemes for the various types of domestic bankruptcy cases).
65
United States v. Frykholm, 362 F.3d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 2004).
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confusion for the courts and third-party claimants trying to recover stolen
or owed funds.66 The forfeiture process does allow recourse for victims
in limited situations, as discussed above. Nevertheless, in cases with
dozens of victims and creditors, especially when there is an
accompanying bankruptcy action, the only way to ensure that these
parties receive some restitution rather than see funds forfeited to the
government is by agreement between the third parties and the
government.

66

See, for example, United States v. Frykholm, where the court opines that the government
could have filed an involuntary bankruptcy action against the defendant to solve the problems
created by the competing claims. Id. at 417. In a Ponzi scheme such as Frykholm, however, there
are likely to be dozens of creditors. No single creditor, including the government, can initiate an
involuntary bankruptcy where there are more than twelve creditors. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b)(2)
(Westlaw 2012). Nevertheless, the government may have the ability to appoint a receiver, who has
the power to initiate a bankruptcy case on the defendant debtor’s behalf.
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